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Robust mechanism design : the role of private information and higher order beliefs / by Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris.
Tipo de material:
TextoSeries World scientific series in economic theory ; 2Detalles de publicación: Singapore ; Hackensack, NJ : World Scientific Pub., 2012.Edición: 1st edDescripción: xvii, 452 p. : ill. ; 24 cmISBN: - 9789814374583 (hbk.)
- 981437458X
- 9789814374590
- 9814374598
- 629.8 23
- TJ217.2 .B47 2012
Contenidos:
Foreword -- Introduction -- Robust mechanism design -- Ex post implementation -- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms -- Robust implementation in general mechanisms -- The role of the common prior in robust implementation -- An ascending auction for interdependent values : uniqueness and robustness to strategic uncertainty -- Robust virtual implementation -- Multidimensional private value auctions -- The robustness of robust implementation -- Rationalizable implementation -- Pricing without priors.
| Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Signatura | Copia número | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | Reserva de ítems | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Colección general
|
Biblioteca Yachay Tech | 629.8312 B495r 2012 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | Ej. 1, Vol. 2 | Disponible | 000855 |
Total de reservas: 0
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Foreword -- Introduction -- Robust mechanism design -- Ex post implementation -- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms -- Robust implementation in general mechanisms -- The role of the common prior in robust implementation -- An ascending auction for interdependent values : uniqueness and robustness to strategic uncertainty -- Robust virtual implementation -- Multidimensional private value auctions -- The robustness of robust implementation -- Rationalizable implementation -- Pricing without priors.
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